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TAKING SHARI' A SERIOUSLY 
THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE. 
Noah Feldman.' Princeton University Press. 2008. Pp. 189. 
Cloth. $22.95. 
Asifa Quraish/ 
Paradigm shifts are not easy. Noah Feldman is taking on a 
big one in his latest book, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, 
where he sets out to re-conceptualize shari'a in the American 
mind as an Islamic rule of law. This is a valuable contribution to 
a discourse in which Muslim desires for shari'a are often 
dismissed as naive steps backwards into theocracy, or worse, 
condemned as demands for gruesome and misogynistic 
punishment or even terrorism. Against these assumptions, 
Feldman confidently insists-quite correctly, in my opinion-
that classical Islamic legal and political institutions were 
organized in a "constitutional" structure that operated as a 
"separation of powers" between the temporal rulers and the 
religious legal scholars. In these systems, Feldman says, because 
God's law (shari'a) was always supreme, it was respect for law 
that held rulers in check, their authority operating in a complex 
(although unwritten) shared power arrangement with the 
scholars who interpreted shari'a for society. Feldman believes 
that an appreciation of the primary feature of these traditional 
Islamic states'-that the rule of God's law stood above the rule 
of individual men- will help explain why the idea of an Islamic 
1. Professor of Law. Harvard University. 
2. Assistant Professor of Law. Universiiv of Wisconsin. 
3. Feldman's use of contemporary l~gal-political terms like .. constitutional. .. 
.. separation of powers ... and even .. state .. strikes me at times as awkwardly anachronistic. 
but I see its usefulness in the ready associations these terms have in his readers· minds. 
Nevertheless. I remain concern~d that these terms. without careful caveats and 
explanations. may ultimately detract from the overall persuasiveness of his presentation. 
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state is so popular today, especially in regions where corrupt 
dictators are the norm. He imagines ways a new Islamic state 
could recapture some of the key features of this old order. 
suggesting models for modern Islamic constitutionalism. His 
book ends with the bold recommendation that a United States 
that is committed to rule of law around the world should support 
new Islamic legal and constitutional institutions when they make 
their play for legitimacy on the basis of promising justice and the 
rule of law via shari'a (p. 150). 
It is obvious what sorts of criticisms Feldman's portrayal 
invites. Any description of a rule of law in which God's Law is 
supreme sounds to most Americans like a theocracy.~ And if 
Islamic constitutionalism means a shari'a-based rule of law in 
which religious law could trump democratic legislation. it is to be 
expected that Americans committed to secular democracy would 
oppose any form of Islamic constitutionalism. modern or 
otherwise. Moreover, looking around the world at Islamic states 
today, many find that the sorts of laws promoted as shari'a-
mandated conflict with global civil and human rights norms. If it 
is believed that Islamic law demands. for example, that an 
Islamic state should stone adulterers and give men more divorce 
rights than women, then no version of a shari'a-inspired 
separation of powers will alleviat~ the problems many have with 
the substance of Islamic law itself.' 
These are powerful arguments. only partially answered in 
Feldman's book. Where he does not answer them directly, 
appropriate conclusions could be extrapolated by the reader. 
but. because the paradigm shift Feldman attempts is so great. 
many of his readers are not likely to do so, leaving his ultimate 
conclusions vulnerable. Below. I offer a critique of Feldman's 
4. See. e.g.. Leon Wieseltier. Theologico-PoliTicus. THE NEW REPUBLIC. April 9. 
2008. at 48 (describing Feldman's argument as a ··shilling for a soft theocracy"). 
5. These arguments are primary themes in critiques by people like Haider 
Hamoudi and Said Arjomand. See Haider Ala Hamoudi. OrienTa/ism and "The Fall and 
Rise of The Islamic SraTe" 17 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2008-
27). a·vai/able aT http://ssrn.com/abstract=l266386 (citing. among other examples. "the 
case of the Sudan. yet another devastating example of the entire disrespect of an Islamist 
party. the National Islamic Front ('NIF') for the rule of law"): Posting of Said Amir 
Arjomand to The Immanent Frame. http:!/blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/03/28/why-shariah/ 
(Mar. 28. 2008) (critiquing Feldman's New York Times Magazine article entitled "Why 
Shariah~" which previews many arguments in The Rise and Fall of The !slamic SraTe) 
("The legal evidence we have from the countries in which it has been tried suggests that 
the demands for the implementation of the Shariah primarily means that of its penal 
code (hudud) with severe punishments for adultery. theft and blasphemy which gravely 
disadvantage the women. the poor and the religiously deviant. and has no constitutional 
component."). 
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book that focuses on how his thesis could be strengthened by 
more direct engagement with these important contemporary 
concerns. First, I believe that Feldman's arguments could be 
framed with clearer language in order to distinguish the various 
types of law implicated in his presentation. In Part I below, I 
explain why, without more careful delineation of the differences 
between shari'a and fiqh, and fiqh and siyasa, some very 
important normative distinctions inherent to the field of Islamic 
law can be lost. Then, in Part II below, I comment on the 
modern shari'a constitutional models imagined by Feldman, 
pointing out the confusion that can result from his amalgamation 
of fiqh and siyasa lawmaking. I explain why, when translated 
into global questions about modern Islamic constitutionalism, 
this merging of concepts can cause unnecessary distortions and 
concerns about the viability of shari'a as the rule of law principle 
that Feldman has so skillfully set out to articulate. 
I. LANGUAGE CHOICE: DISTINGUISHING SHARI'A, 
FIQH AND SlY ASA 
Language is crucial when writing in a field unfamiliar to a 
large part of one's audience. For Feldman's current work, this is 
especially true of the word "shari'a," and he realizes this. As he 
put it in a recent New York Times Magazine article, "[ o ]ne 
reason for the divergence between Western and Muslim views of 
Shariah is that we are not all using the word to mean the same 
thing. Although it is commonplace to use the word 'Shariah' and 
the phrase 'Islamic law' interchangeably, this prosaic English 
translation does not capture the full set of associations that the 
term "Shariah' conjures for the believer."6 In The Fall and Rise, 
Feldman does a good job of appropriately broadening the 
meaning of shari'a beyond its most narrow translations, but his 
word usage is nevertheless not always consistent and at times can 
be confusing. Feldman uses shari'a to refer not only to broad 
concepts of justice, like the "rule of law." and even "law" itself in 
the most abstract sense,' but also to overall structures of 
government' and then to "Islamic law" as the body of doctrinal 
rules articulated by religious legal scholars. 9 
6. Noah Feldman. Whl' Shariah?. NEW YORK TI\!ES MAGAZINE. March 16. 2008. 
at 46. 48. · 
7. See, e.g.. p. 6 ("The Islamic state is preeminently a shari'a state. defined by its 
commitment to a vision of legal order. ... The system was justified by Jaw. and the 
system administered basic government through Jaw."). 
8. See. e.g.. p. 21 ('''Islam· means the shari'a. understood as an all-encompassing 
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The problem with using the same word (shari'a) for both 
religious legal doctrine and big rule-of-law concepts is that these 
two ideas contradict each other in many readers' minds. Many 
Americans already identify shari'a with things like stoning, hand 
amputation and unequal rights for women. Given this backdrop, 
an assertion that shari'a is the "rule of law" for Muslims risks 
entrenching the idea that Muslims have a warped sense of justice 
that cannot be reconciled with contemporary international 
norms. Noah Feldman himself does not subscribe to this notion, 
but without more careful use of terms and conceptual categories. 
his book might be misconstrued to support it. By providing more 
information about Islamic law at a theoretical as well as practical 
level. Feldman could avoid much of this confusion, and 
moreover. place his ruler-scholar "separation of powers" thesis 
into greater context. 
Specifically. Feldman's book could better emphasize the 
difference between the terms "shari'a" and "fiqh." Although 
both can be translated as "Islamic law." the two words portray 
very different concepts. Shari'a literally means "way" or "road.'' 
and as a legal term, refers to "God's Law.'' a divine exhortation 
to all Muslims about the ideal way to behave in this world. 
Because the two scriptural sources of information about this 
road (the Quran. and the life example of the Prophet 
Mohammed) do not answer every possible life and legal 
question. Muslim scholars engaged (and continue to engage) in 
legal interpretation of those sources to come up with detailed 
rules on a wide range of legal topics, including those that 
American lawyers would put in categories like torts. contracts, 
property. family and criminal law. These rules are called "fiqh," 
which literally means "understanding." 
The use of the term "fiqh" and not "shari'a'' for these 
doctrinal rules of Islamic law is epistemologically significant. It 
reflects the classical Muslim scholars' awareness that 
interpretation of divine texts is an unavoidably human, and 
therefore fallible. effort. Moreover. the fallibility of fiqh rules 
had several significant consequences for the evolution of Islamic 
structure that precisely orders social relations and facilitates economic justice .... [T]o 
understand the shari'a as a constitutional ground rule is to invoke a rich and complex 
historv of constitutional law and theorv that stretches back centuries."). 
9. See. e.g.. p. 115 ("The negative political side of the invocation of the shari'a is 
that. taken as a set of substantive rules. the classical Islamic law is decidedly 
nonrnodern."). p. 116 (''the non-modern features of the shari'a that are most salient 
include harsh corporal punishment. .. ). 
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law and government. First. because fiqh scholars recognized that 
their extrapolations of legal rules were always at best only 
probable (rather than certain) articulations of God's Law 
(shari'a), every fiqh scholar's conclusions (as long as they were 
the product of sincere interpretive effort) had equal legitimacy 
and authority for Muslims who sought to live by shari'a. Islamic 
law as a whole, therefore, is not one legal code but rather a 
pluralism of legal schools, each with distinct interpretive 
methodologies and corresponding bodies of legal doctrine. 
The fallible and pluralistic nature of the fiqh also 
contributed to a bifurcation of legal authority in classical Muslim 
societies-a bifurcation that is important to Feldman's 
"separation of powers" thesis. Fiqh scholars were generally 
reluctant to have the fiqh doctrine of one school forced upon the 
whole population, and instead advocated institutional 
mechanisms that allowed Muslims to live according to the school 
of their choice. At the same time. rulers of Muslim lands sought 
to establish uniform rules to govern society, especially in areas 
like taxes. marketplace standards, criminal investigation and 
prosecution, and military service. These ruler-made laws-
siyasa-were quite different in nature and effect than the fiqh. 
Fiqh was the product of jurisprudential analyses of divine texts 
by individual religious scholars whose work in this regard did not 
depend upon any official position or appointment. Siyasa, on the 
other hand, was created not by scholars parsing divine texts, but 
by those holding physical power, following their own 
philosophies of government and ideas about how best to 
maintain public order. From a shari'a perspective, rulers had 
legitimate authority to do this because maintenance of public 
order and safety is part of the Qur'anic vision of a good ruler. 10 
The two realms of legal authority, fiqh and siyasa-scholars and 
rulers- operated in many different institutional forms 
throughout Muslim history, but the interdependence of these 
powers was a consistent feature of the rule of law of classical 
shari' a-based societies. 11 
10. Whether the rulers actually did act for the public good is another question. and 
was the source of much discussion and frustration for manv scholars. Nevertheless. as 
long as the ruler allowed a basic minimal level of religious· practice (i.e. did not force 
Muslims to sin). the classical jurists writing political theory generally gave great latitude 
to the ruler's power. and the rulers in turn generally left the articulation of the fiqh to the 
f1qh scholars.) For a brief description of the scholars· attitudes on this point. see 
Mohammad H. Fadel. The True, the Good, and the Reasonable: The Theological and 
Ethical Roots of Puh/ic Reason in Islamic Law, 21 CA:o-;. J.L. & JCRIS. 5 (2008). 
11. For a look at how these two realms intersected on the ground in everyday 
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When Noah Feldman describes the ··constitutional" 
structure of the traditional "Islamic state" as a separation of 
powers between rulers and scholars, he essentially describes the 
fiqh and siyasa realms. but without using these particular terms. 
He does use the word fiqh to refer to scholar-created Islamic 
legal doctrine. but the term appears only once in the entire 
book. 12 And instead of siyasa, he uses the phrase ''administrative 
regulations," 13 which has the effect of downplaying its status as 
"law," giving the impression that ruler siyasa merely filled 
administrative gaps in a .fiqh-dominated legal universe. This can 
be misleading. Siyasa was powerful law; it was the legal arm of 
caliphs, sultans and kings, giving them a way to directly impact 
people's lives in a wide range of areas from crime to taxes. It is 
important to recognize the real lawmaking aspect of the siyasa 
power of Muslim rulers because it gives it a status parallel to that 
of the fiqh authority of the scholars and thereby further 
elucidates the ''checking and balancing'' relationship between 
them. 14 
Using a fiqh-siyasa template to explain the classical Muslim 
"separation of powers" also helps to show why a shari'a-based 
system does not necessitate a theocracy. The classical fiqh-siyasa 
division of legal and political authority was, quite simply, never a 
society. see Kristen Stilt's study of the muhtasib in Mamluk Egypt. Kristen Stilt. Price 
Setting and Harding in Mamluk Egypt. in THE LAW APPLIED: COI\TEXTUALIZING THE 
ISLA\1IC SHARI'A 57 (Peri Berman. eta!. eds .. 2008). 
12. Seep. 42 (denoting the "Islamic legal doctrine" applied by judges). 
13. See, e.g.. p. 42. (". . . the Islamic constitutional order always included 
administrative regulations with the force of law that were issued by the ruler or his 
deputies"). p. 46 ("It ... made sense for [the ruler] to use his power to issue 
administrative regulations to enhance his wealth or to punish those who opposed him."). 
p. 50 ("Because the shari'a as interpreted by the scholars ultimately authorized the ruler 
to issue administrative regulations ... "). p. 61 ("In the classical Sunni constitutional 
balance. the shari'a existed alongside a body of administrative regulations that governed 
manv matters in the realms of taxation and criminal law."). 
i4. Further confusion on the nature of ruler siyasa results from Feldman's using the 
word "shari'a" where fiqh would be more appropriate. For example. his descriptions that 
shari'a existed "alongside" ruler administrative regulations (p. 61) seems to directly 
contradict the idea that these regulations had to comply with shari'a. Seep. 64 (''Under 
the classical Islamic constitution. the condition for the administrative regulations was that 
the shari'a authorized the ruler to issue these regulations."). Another example of the 
confusion of using shari'a where fiqh would make more sense. is the following statement: 
"In each situation where administrative regulations were issued and enforced. one could 
say that the rules that applied to ordinary people in their daily lives were not the rules of 
the shari'a itself' (p. 43). This prompts a useful commentary from Feldman on the 
misplaced questioning of whether Islamic law is really "law" at all. But. despite the 
helpful insights Feldman offers on this point. his discussion would benefit from more 
carefully-crafted use of language. in which "fiqh" refers to discrete legal doctrine based 
on scripture. "siyasa" is ruler-made temporal law. and "shari'a" is reserved for the 
abstract concept of God's Law. of which the other two are both subordinate. 
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theocratic distribution of power. Rulers and scholars occupied 
separate realms in classical Muslim societies. Though there was 
occasional cooperation and coordination between them, as a 
norm, Muslim religious scholars did not hold temporal power. 
and Muslim rulers did not articulate religious law. Even taking 
into account the political-theological differences between Sunni 
and Shi'a doctrines about ideal government, 15 for the bulk of 
Muslim history neither Sunni nor Shi'a fiqh scholars sought 
control of the political realm of the rulers. 16 And Muslim rulers 
made siyasa law not by jurisprudential analysis of divine texts (as 
the fiqh was), but from their own determinations of governing 
needs. 17 In short, the early indeterminacy and bifurcation of the 
15. Classical shi'i legal and political theory centers the authority of decision-making 
in the infallibility of a divinely-inspired Imam descended from the Prophet. From this. it 
follows that the ruler should be not only a jurist but also the divinely-appointed Imam of 
that age. See ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA. THE JUST RULER IN SH!"ITE ISLAM: THE 
COMPREHENSIVE ACTHORITY OF THE JuRIST IN IMAMITE JURISPRUDENCE (1988). In 
Shi'i legal theory. God is the fountainhead of the Law. and enforces this Law through the 
Imam. who in turn is served by the mujtahids (scholars of ijtihad-qualifications) for the 
interpretation of the law and by the heads of Shi'i temporal states. Shi'i mujtahids can 
neither create law nor deduce new rules: theirs is merely the duty to interpret. referring 
always to the imam's word. See A.A.A. Fyzee. Shi'i Legal Theories. in LAw IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 113. 121-27 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert Liebesny eds .. 1955). But when 
the last Imam went into occultation. this aspect of Shi'i law ceased to have much practical 
impact. since traditional Shi'i theology held that jurists should not be in a position of 
political power without the presence of the Imam. Until the Imam's return. Shi'a fiqh 
scholars found themselves in much the same position as their Sunni counterparts: aware 
of their own fallibility. yet nevertheless offering probable articulations of God's Law. 
16. This. of course. changed with Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of the vilayat-al-
fagih. which ultimately became the political doctrine of legitimacy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran after 1979. But it is important to remember that Khomeini's theory 
itself represents a departure from the classical Shi'a position which maintained that 
political power was for the Imam's return. See ISLA!\1 AND REVOLUTION: WRITINGS AND 
DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI (Hamid Algar trans .. 1981): CHIBL! MALLAT. THE 
RENEWAL OF ISLA!\IIC LAW ( 1993 ): SACHEDINA. supra note 15. 
17. Islamic legal and political history is thus different from Christian legal and 
political history in this very significant way: not only was there no state "church" in 
Islamic history. but there was no "church" at all for the state to co-opt (or to be co-opted 
by). Most historians point to the Abbassid period called the "mihna" as the major-and 
ultimately unsuccessful-attempt by Muslim rulers to dictate belief upon the people. See 
1 MARSHALL G.S. HODGSON. THE VENTURE OF ISLAM: THE CLASSICAL AGE OF 
ISLAM. 285-319. 479-89 (1974 ). It was the resistance of the religious legal scholars (most 
famously Ahmad Ibn Hanbal) to this attempt. upon pain of torture and even death. that 
many see as the crucial moment that resulted in the lasting division of rights and 
responsibilities of Muslim rulers and scholars: Rulers would maintain order in societv. 
but they could not control belief: and religious legal scholars could articulate God's La~. 
but they would not claim political power. This division of power reflects in many ways 
the same motivation behind the separation of church and state in modern western 
democracies (namely. avoiding the oppression that can result from state control of 
belief). but. as Islam did not have a "church" to separate from the state. to protect 
religious freedom Muslims separated types of law: Rulers would make siyasa (binding on 
everyone. but not an articulation of God's Law). and religious scholars would make fiqh 
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law in Muslim societies essentially demanded non-theocratic 
government structures. 
Noah Feldman knows this, of course, but some of the 
descriptive language he uses in The Fall and Rise can at times 
obscure this reality. For example, in describing the similarities of 
Saudi Arabia to the classical system, he writes: "the king lacks 
the authority to legislate-and it goes without saying that no 
other legislative body exists either. Law, properly speaking, is 
what the scholars, using the interpretive process, understand 
God to have commanded" (p. 96). But of course this is not 
exactly correct. Classical Muslim "kings" did have the authority 
to "legislate": rulers made siyasa law all the time. What they did 
not have authority to create was fiqh. However, this point is 
obscured by Feldman's description of the classical Muslim legal 
landscape, which presents fiqh as the dominant law, only 
supplemented by rulers' "administrative regulations. "18 In other 
words, in this book, Feldman often equates "law" with the fiqh 
enterprise of interpreting the shari'a (depicted as "God's 
legislation"), and therefore all other rule making pales in 
comparison. This is actually a common attitude for any study of 
''Islamic law," defined as the doctrinal rules derived from Islamic 
scripture. From this perspective, it makes sense to say that law is 
"what the scholars ... understand God to have commanded," (p. 
96) because this accurately describes what fiqh is. 
But fiqh does not exhaust the field of what can be 
considered "law" in Muslim history if one is looking at the larger 
"balance of powers" picture that includes both rulers and 
scholars-which is the perspective that Feldman presumably 
wants us to take. From this view, siyasa rules are law too-
perhaps even more properly so, from a modern secular 
perspective. Without this awareness, readers might easily 
interpret Feldman's fiqh-centric depiction as describing a 
theocracy, with religious scholars in charge of all legislation. This 
would be an inaccurate understanding of classical Muslim law 
and government, because siyasa lawmaking was not dictated by 
fiqh authorities any more than fiqh lawmaking was dictated by 
siyasa authorities. The potential for confusion is heightened by 
Feldman's dual use of the word shari'a to refer both to fiqh legal 
doctrine as well an Islamic "rule of law." Only by keeping the 
(an articulation of God's Law. but only with probable authority to be the truth. and 
therefore not binding in and of itself). 
18. See. e.g.. p. 115 ("the classical Islamic state with its qadis. muftis and 
supplemental administrative regulations"). 
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two ideas distinct does the following sentence not sound like a 
theocracy: "as a matter of principle. the complex of [ruler] 
administrative regulations was subordinate to the authority of 
the shari'a-and hence to the authority of the scholars who were 
uniquely in control of its content" (pp. 43-44). This is true-and 
should not be a threatening idea to American readers-if we 
understand shari'a to mean the rule of law ideal of God's Law, 
but not if it means the doctrinal fiqh. Moreover, attention to the 
parallel legal powers of siyasa and fiqh also gives weight to 
Feldman's "separation of powers" thesis. That is, it makes sense 
that rulers and scholars would "check and balance" each other if 
siyasa and fiqh occupy separate but interdependent and equally 
powerful lawmaking realms. But if siyasa is unimportant and the 
law of fiqh is the only law that exists, this leaves very little space 
for negotiation of power between them. 19 
II. INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: CONTEMPLATING A 
SHARI'A-INSPIRED MODERN SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
I agree with Noah Feldman's basic thesis that there was a 
constitutional separation of powers between rulers and scholars 
in pre-modern Muslim societies, and that this arrangement 
constituted a shari'a rule of law. I especially support this 
approach because I believe it is the most accessible way to 
translate classical Islamic legal and political history into twenty-
first century concepts for western-educated audiences. I am also 
very glad to see Feldman focus on the role played by the scholars 
as a crucial element missing in failed attempts to establish the 
rule of law in many Muslim-majority countries today. Many 
observers do not fully appreciate the significance of the changed 
role of fiqh scholars that occurred with the transformation of 
legal institutions in Muslim societies from the classical to the 
modern era. As Feldman puts it. "the displacement of the shari'a 
and the decline of the scholarly class left behind no institutional 
force capable of effectuating a replacement" (p. 90) of the 
previous separation of powers, without which these societies 
19. When the scholars publicly criticized a ruler's behavior on shari'a-based 
grounds. the potential for social resistance and revolt was often enough for a ruler to 
modify his actions. On the other hand. because the fiqh scholars commanded no armv. 
rulers could in turn .. check .. the scholars. by simply choosing to ignore their protests an'd 
address any potential social resistance with their considerable police power. In other 
words. the complex and interdependent relationship between these two realms of legal 
authority (fiqh and siyasa) is important to fully appreciating Feldman's rule of law thesis. 
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were left subject to the whim of domineering executives. He 
suggests that if new Islamic states "can find an institution to fill 
the role traditionally played by the scholars, it has a reasonable 
chance of establishing political justice, and through it, popular 
legitimacy'' (p. 14). I find this suggestion very insightful and 
forward-looking. 
But I have concerns about Feldman's vision for what these 
new institutions might look like. Islamists looking to develop 
new institutions with "their own original and distinctive way of 
giving real life to the ideals of Islamic law," he suggests, might 
create an "Islamically oriented legislature, infused with the spirit 
of a democratized shari'a" or "a court exercising Islamic judicial 
review to shape and influence laws passed in its shadow" (p. 
147). 20 That is. Feldman imagines that a shari'a-enacting 
legislature or a shari'a-checking court could fill the void 
previously occupied by the classical fiqh scholars. This proposal 
answers the obvious need for a strong counter-balance to the 
lopsided dominance of executive power in so many Muslim-
majority countries today, but it draws a strained parallel between 
the lawmaking power of fiqh scholars and that of modern 
legislatures and judges. Let us take the "Islamically-oriented 
legislature'' proposal first. Simply put, fiqh lawmaking is not 
democratic lawmaking. Fiqh doctrine, recall, emerges from 
jurisprudential parsing of Muslim scriptural sources, whereas 
democratic legislation results from political debates and 
pragmatic evaluations about what best serves the public good. 
Moreover, from its inception fiqh lawmaking has existed 
independent of the state: the authority of fiqh scholars comes 
not from any state appointment but from the public reputation 
established by their work. In fact, of the two types of law of the 
classical Muslim world (fiqh and siyasa) it is actually siyasa 
lawmaking-not fiqh lawmaking-that better parallels the work 
that goes on in a democratic legislature. The work of fiqh 
scholars is closer to the work of contemporary law professors 
than legislators. In fact, it is likely that it was precisely the 
"academic freedom" of the fiqh scholars that made their ability 
to check the power of the rulers viable, because their articulation 
20. Feldman is vague about the details of what this might look like. creating many 
unanswered questions. For example. in his reference to "[a] democratically elected 
legislature responsible for enacting provisions in accordance with-or at least not 
repugnant to-the shari'a" (p. 124). he does not elaborate whether this means a 
codification of established fiqh doctrine. or just legislating within the context of a respect 
for an abstract divine rule of law. and avoiding legislation that forces Muslims to sin. 
2010) BOOK REVIEW 307 
of shari'a was not tainted by suspicion of government controL A 
modern legislature cannot carry the same sort of "outside the 
beltway" external check on government power because it is itself 
part of the government. 
Moreover. the concept of a shari'a-enacting legislature 
prompts some peculiar questions. For example, Feldman asks: 
"what must be done if the laws passed by the legislature ... do 
not correspond to the 'true' content of Islamic law or values" (p. 
121)? This is a strange question because (as Feldman alludes to 
with quotation marks around the word "true") Muslims have 
long accepted that it is impossible for humans in this lifetime to 
know with any certainty the "true" content of God's law. As 
described earlier, human fallibility and the corresponding 
indeterminacy of truth were building blocks of Islamic 
jurisprudence. This is, after all, why there are so many 
established schools of fiqh doctrine-each operating on the 
probability that it might have articulated the "true" shari'a, but 
leaving open the possibility that it might be wrong. This brings us 
to the inherent challenge in the proposal for a shari'a-checking 
court. If the many schools of fiqh are all simultaneously 
legitimate articulations of shari'a, then on what basis will the 
court "check" legislation for shari'a compliance? Whatever 
shari'a-based judgments are made by such a court will likely be 
felt by the population as a state adopts one fiqh interpretation 
over others and imposes it upon the entire population. This 
merges fiqh and siyasa power in a new and dangerous way. If the 
government has the power to enact its understanding of shari'a, 
get approval of this interpretation from a shari'a court judgment, 
and then use its police power to enforce it, those citizens who 
disagree with the government's interpretation of Islam are left 
with no avenues to opt-out, even if their interpretation is based 
on a historically-established fiqh school of law.21 Ironically, this 
21. This state monopoly of law is quite different from the classical Muslim ruler· 
scholar model in which rulers controlled the content of only siyasa law, and did not 
influence fiqh articulations of shari'a. It is true that rulers enforced fiqh-based judgments, 
by appointing judges to adjudicate cases litigating fiqh issues, but in doing so, they did 
not articulate fiqh doctrine. The content of the fiqh by which these judges ruled was that 
of the fiqh literature. not ruler decrees. Rulers never had authority to create or change 
the content of fiqh scholars· articulations of God's Law. Their power over fiqh extended 
only as far as the siyasa arm of enforcement could reach. Thus. classical Muslim legal 
systems could accommodate pluralistic applications of fiqh within its populations because 
of the inherent bifurcation of legal realms: the rulers would create and enforce only 
siyasa laws-those that are based on evaluations of general public order, while the 
scholars would articulate God's Law (shari'a) as best they could, but their resulting legal 
doctrine (fiqh) was not binding in and of itself. Moreover. many rulers respected fiqh 
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scenario is more theocratic than most classical Islamic systems 
were. A crucial element is the modern nation-state context, 
which operates not with a pluralistic, opt-in type of legal 
authority, but rather one of uniformly enforced laws. Uniform 
laws enforced on everyone works quite well for general public 
order, siyasa-type, laws, but a government risks oppression and 
theocracy when it enforces laws enacted on the basis of a 
religious mandate. In other words, from both a classical Muslim 
perspective as well as a modern secular one, it is not appropriate 
for a legislature to be trying to "get shari'a right," nor for a court 
to be declaring whether or not it did so. 
A final note on the popular relevance of fiqh today. The 
independent nature of fiqh scholarship continues today, despite 
the widespread dismantling or reforming of classical Islamic 
educational institutions during and after colonialism. The fiqh 
scholars extant today still hold incredible prestige with large 
numbers of Muslim populations, as Feldman himself has 
eloquently illustrated in his description of Ayatollah Sistani's 
role in influencing the state-building process in Iraq. 22 Pluralistic 
though it is, and lacking the institutional infrastructure that it 
once had, the loosely-linked global community of fiqh scholars 
nevertheless remains the authoritative source of shari'a 
knowledge for vast numbers of Muslims around the world. Thus, 
even when a modern state claims to enact Islamic law, or strike 
down secular legislation for shari'a-non-compliance, it does not 
carry the same shari'a authority that fiqh scholars do with a large 
percentage of their Muslim populations. 
Keeping all this in mind, it does not seem that Feldman's 
vision of a shari'a-enacting democratic legislature or a court's 
shari'a-checking power of judicial review can fill the void left by 
the fiqh scholars. Under the classical model described by 
Feldman, state siyasa power was balanced by the non-state 
power of the scholars and vice versa. But Feldman's proposal 
separates only siyasa power, dividing it into three parts 
(executive, legislative and judicial). In itself, this is not a bad 
idea. Dividing unilateral (often dictatorial) state power into 
separate entities such that no branch has a monopoly is certainly 
a step forward in the evolution of siyasa organization. But 
balancing the executive with a legislature is not the same thing as 
diversity by appointing a variety of judges to adjudicate cases according to different 
school doctrine. as needed by the population. 
22. See NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF 
NATION BUILDING 35-42 (2004). 
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balancing rulers with scholars. And assigning shari'a-checking 
authority to a court cannot accomplish the same shari' a check on 
government power as the fiqh scholars did because these 
government branches would likely lack the shari'a-interpreting 
credentials and credibility of independent fiqh scholars. 
In addition, the idea of a legislature with the authority to 
enact shari'a-compliant legislation can create some odd-and 
ultimately counter-productive-concepts. For example. Feldman 
and others posit that one positive potential of democratic bodies 
enacting shari'a-based legislation is a "democratization of the 
shari'a,"23 an idea which resonates with secular democrats as well 
as many Muslim reform thinkers and Islamists who are generally 
frustrated with traditional fiqh scholars claiming a monopoly 
over shari'a interpretation. 24 But a promise to "democratize" the 
shari'a will likely draw immediate resistance from anyone 
understanding shari'a as God's Law, because it implies that 
God's Law itself is subject to a human vote. Even more 
fundamentally, "democratization of shari'a" is inaccurate as a 
description of shari'a-based legislation itself. A legislature is, 
after all, a siyasa institution. By giving it shari'a-enacting power, 
all that has been accomplished is an "Islamization" of 
government (siyasa) lawmaking, but it does not change the 
content of shari'a itself, which still exists as ideal God's Law. Not 
even the fiqh articulation of God's Law has been 
"democratized" because, for vast numbers of Muslims, a fiqh 
conclusion is legitimate as a possible articulation of shari'a only 
if it is the result of independent jurisprudential analysis by a fiqh 
scholar. 
23. See (pp. 117-21 ). He describes this as a fundamental change in the theoretical 
structure underlying Islamic law: 
the shari·a is democratized in that its keeping is given over to a popularly 
elected legislature charged with enacting legislation derived from the source 
that is the shari·a. In practice. this democratization of the shari'a means that the 
interpretation of what the shari'a requires is in the first instance put in the hands 
of the public and its elected representatives. The problem of the missing 
scholars who traditionally interpreted is addressed through the substitution of 
the elected legislature for the scholars. Applied Islamic jurisprudence of the 
kind once practiced by the scholars remains only insofar as it might be relevant 
to a public that wants to draw upon Islamic legal reasoning to ascertain what 
Islamic law requires. (p. 120) 
24. For Feldman's description of the Islamist attitude toward traditionallv-trained 
scholars. see pp. 105-17. · 
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CONCLUSION 
Towards the end of The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. 
Noah Feldman comments that a "new Islamic state, if it is to 
succeed, can learn from aspects of traditional practice, but it 
must do for itself the difficult and slow work of establishing new 
institutions with their own ways of operating that will gradually 
achieve legitimacy" (p. 149). This is an insightful comment. and 
one that I hope his readership will take to heart. I believe. as 
Feldman does, that every society is entitled to legal and political 
institutions that reflect their own culture. values. heritage, and 
aspirations. This premise is a central feature of this book. and 
features prominently in much of Feldman's body of work to 
date.25 In The Fall and Rise, he does an honorable job of bringing 
legitimacy and respect to Islamically-motivated political 
activism. This is not an easy task, given the heavy suspicion of 
Islamism in current western minds. Yet Feldman is persistent. 
These groups are not crazy religious zealots, he insists, but rather 
a modern manifestation of a sincere and laudable desire for 
justice. And their justice-seeking sentiment is rooted in a broad-
based affinity for shari'a, which itself deserves respect as a rule 
of law. He realizes that, for those working in the field of Islamic 
law and constitutionalism, it is important to take seriously the 
ideas of Islamist political parties, whether or not one agrees with 
their overall platforms. 2" This is why Noah Feldman's work is 
valuable paradigm-shifting material. He powerfully argues why 
popular calls for recognition of religious law should be 
addressed, not suppressed. His book offers American readers a 
plausible way to take them seriously, and he suggests 
alternatives to what is often the liberal impulse to find ways to 
make the Islamic resurgence go away. 27 
If Feldman succeeds in nothing more than bringing respect 
to the word shari'a in American minds. he will have made a huge 
and invaluable contribution. But his book has the potential to 
25. See, e.g., FELDMAN. supra note 22: NOAH FELDMAJS. DIVIDED BY GOD: 
AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM- AND WHAT WE SHOCLD DO ABOUT IT (2006 ): 
NOAH FELDMAN. AITER JIHAD: AMERICA AISD THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLA\!IC 
DEMOCRACY (2004). 
26. He even ends his book with the bold recommendation that. "'[w]hen new legal 
and constitutional institutions. Islamic or otherwise. do manage to enter onto the scene 
and make their play for legitimacy. it is imperative to support them"' (p. 150). 
27. As Feldman points out. "'[w]here Islamists win elections in a functioning state. 
the United States and other regional actors are sufficiently nervous about Islamist 
government that opponents-including those prepared to use force-will typically find 
external support for undermining the Islamists in power .. (p. 1-l5). 
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accomplish even more. If it can help shift American attitudes 
about Islamic constitutionalism from dismissive condescension 
of an oxymoron to respect for a legitimate-if complex-pursuit. 
then Feldman's book can have a powerful paradigm-shifting 
influence on global constitutional discourses. I offer the present 
critique in the spirit of supporting this potential. Although I 
disagree with the particular institutional scenarios Feldman 
imagines for modern Islamic constitutionalism. I nevertheless 
strongly appreciate his overall project. and the door that it opens 
to more productive discussion and debate of this important 
world topic. Feldman's approach displays optimism. not 
suspicion. It looks in the direction of mutual respect and 
engagement. which is the best long-term antidote to the violence 
threatened by today's global religious-political conflicts. It is a 
valuable work. 
